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Expressing remorse – or not – appears to influence criminal justice outcomes, but 
preliminary exploration of both judicial and psychological concepts suggests they lack 
clarity.  
 
We asked the following questions: does psychosis impair capacity for, or expression of, 
remorse for a homicide or other serious harm to others? Is failure to express remorse for an 
offence associated with recidivism? We conducted systematic reviews of empirical literature 
on remorse for serious violence while psychotic, and on relationships between remorse and 
reoffending regardless of mental state. No articles on remorse for homicide or other serious 
violence while psychotic were identified.  
 
There is weak evidence that lack of remorse is associated with reoffending generally, but 
nothing specific to psychosis. The literature is strong enough to support a case for research 
into valid measurement of remorse for offending, associations of such measures with 
recidivism, and whether a change in remorse can be effected – or matters. It is not strong 
enough to support reliance on perceptions of the presence or absence of remorse as a basis 
for judicial decisions. 
 
 
1 | I N T R O D U C T I O N  
 
Appearing remorseful after seriously harming another person may help in court. Failure to 
show remorse risks classification as ‘evil’ and deserving of the severest punishment. In 
psychiatric practice, both prominent remorse and apparent failure to express remorse could 
be construed as pathological. Lawyers and mental health practitioners come together when 
an alleged offender is brought before the courts – so what scientific evidence on remorse 
exists to support useful interactions between these professions in the assessment of 
psychosis and serious offending? 
Worldwide, the courts commonly consider evidence of remorse when judging criminal 
cases. In South Carolina, for example, remorse was the third most aggravating factor in 
capital cases (Zhong, 2015). van Oorschot, Mascini, and Weenink (2017) refer to the 
absolute centrality of remorse to judges' decision-making in Dutch courts. In England, an 
observational study of 52 sentencers, sentencing 162 defendants between them, found 
that, while judges took account of the immediate circumstances of the offence, the 
defendant's response to the offence was important. Within the list of mitigating factors that 
most affected outcome, intense remorse was only highly ranked (fourth); it was also, 
however, the third most likely category to produce inconsistent responses (Jacobson & 
Hough, 2007). In Denmark, Johansen (2019) demonstrated the importance of judges' 
‘cultural understanding’ in relation to the offender in determining what constitutes an 
‘appropriate’ emotional response. Zhong et al. (2014), in a study with a quarter (32) of 
Connecticut's experienced judges (range 7–30 years of sitting), found that while each was 
able to describe his or her own system for deciding on the presence or absence of remorse, 
there was considerable inconsistency between them. The media and public also weigh 
remorse heavily when considering offenders (Bibas & Bierschbach, 2004). 
 
Research with experimental juror participants also indicates that their beliefs about a 
defendant's remorse and its mitigating value are linked to aspects of the crime, including its 
planning and ‘viciousness’, but their own characteristics also had some effect (Eisenberg, 
Garvey, & Wells, 1997). 
 
It is not surprising, then, that emphasis on remorse has been challenged in the literature 
(e.g. Bandes, 2018) and concern expressed about the lack of empirical underpinning of its 
use (Maslen, 2015; Padfield, 2013). Further, despite the weight placed on it, we could find 
no widely accepted legal definition, and no reliable and valid rating schedule. This may be 
partly because it is a complex concept that encompasses guilt, shame, regret, contrition and 
repentance (Proeve & Tudor, 2010). Its indicators or components have immediate practical 
implications, such as a guilty plea saving justice resources, at least in the short term. It also 
has longer-term interactional consequences. The latter, through acceptance of expressions 
of regret, may ultimately lead to a restorative justice pathway, but there is a question of the 
genuineness of the offender's position. The German Federal Court of Justice, for example, 
argues that a confession and admission of guilt, revealing truth and acceptance of 
responsibility, will result in mitigation or sentencing discount only if they are accompanied 
by remorse, and are not a dominating, though understandable, motive to receive a more 
lenient punishment [Bundesgerichtshof(Federal Court of Justice) 4 StR 481/16 -Judgment 
from 2 February 2017]. Legal justification lies in a doctrine that has been applied outside as 
well as inside courts, e.g. the truth commissions in South Africa and Rwanda (Gobodo-
Madikizela, 2015). Steps in the process seem to be as follows: I confess; I am truthful; I am 
responsible for what happened (guilty); I regret what I have done; I apologize to the 
victim(s); and I will not do it again. This last component seems to be behind the other key 
judicial reason for allowing remorse to affect sentencing – a remorseful person is perceived 
as needing less deterrence and less incapacitation as s/he is less likely to reoffend (Zhong, 
2015). 
 
In the empirical psychological literature, there is some conflation of remorse with guilt, but 
there is growing evidence for separating guilt from a concept of shame. Tangney, Stuewig, 
and Hafez (2011), for example, argue that‘most psychologists regard remorse as a primary 
component of the guilt experience’. Although they provide little evidence for this statement 
per se, they present a well evidenced argument for making a distinction between guilt and 
shame, the former a potentially constructive experience of taking responsibility for an 
action and the latter a position that is associated with avoidance of considering a state or 
act, which may actually inhibit its resolution. In relation to offending, this could increase risk 
of repetition. Tilghman-Osborne, Cole, and Felton (2010) consider that the literature 
supports 23 theory-based definitions of guilt and 25 measures of guilt, with a lack of 
conceptual convergence. The measures do not necessarily correspond to the definitions 
from which they are derived. These authors suggest, however, two main clusters of 
measures: one of trait-like characteristics, including sense of moral and social transgression 
– or lack of it – largely internalized and private to the person; and the other, they suggest, 
perhaps capturing traits but also event-specific behaviours, and which is more public. The 
latter would encompass activity, including developing feelings of responsibility, apology, and 
reparation, and remorse. In essence, painful feelings about transgressions of some kind – 
not necessarily criminal – are, on the one hand, internalized as largely self-tormenting 
shame, with some avoidance or reality, and, on the other, displayed as a more public face of 
guilt which, in turn, has more practical, reparative value. 
Capacities for remorse and empathy have been linked in the psychological literature, 
although sometimes with emphasis on the remorse of the offender generating empathy in 
the person offended against (Davis & Gold, 2011). Empathy refers to the capacity to 
recognize, understand and feel the state of mind of another and to generate an appropriate 
response to those experiences. Empathy impairments have been evidenced among people 
with schizophrenia (e.g. Derntl et al., 2009), with a probable anatomical component in 
damage to frontotemporal regions of the brain (Derntl et al., 2012), particularly affecting 
‘perspective taking’ and emotional responsiveness.  Furthermore, the kind of cognitive 
distortion that is fundamental to a delusion may mean that, in this context, if a violent act is 
delusionally driven, far from taking the victim's perspective or even understanding that the 
person assaulted has become a victim, the action may seem entirely ‘right’. According to 
Zhong et al. (2014), most judges do think that mental illness is likely to affect the relevance 
of remorse: “Your ability to be able to put yourself in someone else's shoes is clouded by 
your mental illness” or “mental illness ‘almost neutralizes’ remorse”. Nevertheless, given 
evidence that impairments in empathy or components of it are associated with violence 
with psychosis (Bragado-Jiménez & Taylor, 2012) or without it (Jolliffe & Farrington, 2004), it 
may be argued that it could be useful to consider evidence on the nature and extent of 
remorse, at least when making decisions about release after a period of treatment, if not in 
court. 
 
Our aims, therefore, were to examine evidence on remorse among people with delusions or 
wider evidence of psychosis after the most serious of crimes – homicide. Our research 
questions were: Is there evidence in already published literature that capacity for remorse 
or its expression after a homicide is impaired among people with psychosis? Is there 
evidence for change in remorse during the course of the illness and its treatment? To what 
extent is violent recidivism associated with failure to experience or express remorse and 
does this differ between people with and without psychosis? 
 
2 METHODS 
Two separate systematic reviews were conducted – one for each research question – using 
the search databases Scopus, Psycinfo, Medline, Web of Science and Assia. 
Terms for the first review were chosen not only for delusion, but also for psychosis more 
widely to ensure full capture of relevant material. To the term remorse, we added terms for 
presumed components or relevant processing skills. The final list of search terms was 
entered into the databases as follows, adjusting for syntax relevant to each database: 
(“Psychosis” OR “psychotic illness*” OR “schizo” OR “schizoaffective” OR “psychotic*” OR 
“delusion” OR “hallucination” OR “negative symptom”) AND (“Remorse” OR “guilt” OR 
“shame” OR “repent” “empathy” OR “regret*”). For the second question about remorse and 
recidivism, as we wanted to be able to compare risk of recidivism in the context of remorse 
or its absence with and without delusions or psychosis, we excluded the psychosis terms. 
The following terms were used in the same databases, in a similar manner: (“Remorse” OR 
“guilt*” OR “shame*” OR “repent*” OR “empathy”) AND (“reoffend” OR “recidivism” OR 
“relapse” OR “repeat crime” OR “revert*”). The final search algorithms for each database, 
with search results, are given in the Online Appendix 1. The results were exported to 
ENDNOTE and duplicates were removed. Reference lists of each selected article were checked 
for further relevant material, and authors were contacted, where possible, about further 
work in the field. The following journals were hand‐searched for the complete years 2013–
2019: Behavioral Sciences and the Law; Cornell Law Review online; Criminal Behaviour and 
Mental Health; Journal of American Psychoanalytic Association; Medicine, Science and the 
Law; International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology; Criminal 
Justice and Behavior; Aggressive and Violent Behavior; Australian and New Zealand Journal 
of Criminology; Journal of Forensic Psychiatry and Psychology; Clinical Psychology Review; 
New York University Review of Law and Social Change; and The Journal of the American 
Academy of Psychiatry and the Law. 
Articles were included in the first review only if a diagnosis of psychosis had been made 
and/or psychotic symptoms had been recorded according to a tested and recognized 
measure or system and reference had been made to remorse, guilt or shame in relation to a 
homicide or other seriously violent offence. Articles were excluded if the work had been 
done only with healthy people or only people with other diagnoses and there was either no 
reference to remorse or, where there was, it was confined to concerns about non‐criminal 
matters (e.g. personal health or having a stillborn child) or was a long‐standing trait. No 
diagnostic restrictions were imposed on the second review, but only studies that recorded 
remorse and/or sense of guilt for a specified index offence and had measured violent 
reoffending subsequently were included.  
Selections for possible inclusion were made from the first 100 titles and abstracts by three 
of us (AD, NK, PJT), each blind to the other's selections. There was 98% agreement, so AD 
completed the rest of the selection alone. Data were then extracted from each selected 
article according to a purpose‐designed checklist. 
Meta‐analysis was considered. 
 
3 RESULTS 
Among 2823 potentially relevant, unique titles identified, there were no studies of remorse 
for a homicide or other seriously violent act among people with delusions, other psychotic 
symptoms or a diagnosis of schizophrenia or similar condition (see Figure 1). Several articles 
referred to guilt as a symptom of psychosis that worsened with the severity of the illness, 
but none evaluated this in relation to any specified and real act.  
 
Figure 1 
Prisma flow chart 
Just two studies were identified that tested associations between remorse or guilt for a 
particular offence and subsequent recidivism, although neither did so among people with a 
psychotic illness (see Table 1). One was a substantial study of young men in prison in 
northern Germany, which found some association between feelings of guilt within a month 
of arriving in prison and desistence from further offending, even after allowing for other 
potentially relevant variables, and interaction between guilt and shame (Hosser et al., 
2008). Slightly under half of these young men described experiencing guilt often, but the 
most striking finding was that the proportion experiencing such guilt reduced over time, 
even after allowing for sample attrition with release. Conversely, the less ‘useful’ sense of 
shame increased over time. A small Swedish study of male adolescents in residential 
settings failed to find a relationship overall between admission of the crime and feelings of 
guilt for it and subsequent recidivism (Holmqvist et al., 2009). There was, however, an 
intervention interaction effect between less initial consciousness of guilt and impact of an 
aggression replacement training intervention, with those young men with lower initial 
consciousness of guilt benefiting most.  
Table 1. Remorse and recidivism  
Study 
questions 
Sample Measures Findings 
Authors’ 
conclusions 
Comments 
Referenc
e, place 
Are feelings 
of shame 
and guilt 
during 
imprisonme
nt related 
to criminal 
behaviour 
after 
release 
from 
prison? 
1243 
young 
male 
prisoner
s, mean 
age 21 
(median 
20, 
range 
14–24) 
from six 
northern 
German 
prisons, 
1998–
2001 
Standard 
interview 
after 
4 weeks in 
prison, 8 
weeks in 
prison, close 
to release 
(up to 10 
years) 
Shame and 
guilt: Emo‐
16‐week 
scale 
Recidivism: 
one or more 
new 
convictions 
after release 
(Federal 
registry) 
At 1st 
interview – 
428 (30%) 
never felt 
guilt (no 
guilt), 859 
(60%) never 
felt shame 
At 2nd 
interview – 
685 (48%) 
no guilt, 859 
(63%) no 
shame 
At 3rd 
interview – 
346 (61%) 
no guilt, 412 
(72%) no 
shame 
In Cox 
hazard 
models, 
shame and 
guilt at the 
first 
interview 
each had a 
small 
significant 
relationship 
with 
recidivism 
(p < 0.05), 
independen
tly of other 
relevant 
variables 
(e.g. age) 
54% of 
those with 
guilt but no 
shame and 
40% with 
shame but 
no guilt had 
no new 
conviction 
Feelings of 
shame and 
guilt 
decreased 
rapidly 
during the 
first weeks 
of 
imprisonme
nt and 
continued 
to decrease 
during the 
course of 
imprisonme
nt 
As 
hypothesize
d, guilt 
feelings are 
associated 
with lower 
risk of 
recidivism 
but shame 
with higher 
risk of 
recidivism 
No specific 
guilt/sham
e‐related 
interventio
n 
Hosser, 
Windzio, 
and 
Greve 
(2008), 
Germany 
Study 
questions 
Sample Measures Findings 
Authors’ 
conclusions 
Comments 
Referenc
e, place 
Is guilt 
about a 
crime 
related to 
subsequent 
offending? 
Does 
Aggression 
Replaceme
nt Training 
(ART) affect 
this 
relationship
? 
57 young 
male 
offender
s (mean 
age 17 
years, 
range 
16–19) 
in one of 
two 
types of 
residenti
al 
setting, 
with 
different 
treatme
nt 
models 
Guilt – 
Holmqvist 
Affect 
Consciousne
ss Interview 
Reoffending 
– national 
sentence 
and police 
suspicion 
registers, 
applying 
penalty 
value scale 
Overall, 
adolescents 
who 
admitted 
their crimes 
at intake or 
who could 
talk about 
guilt for 
their 
criminal acts 
were not 
less likely to 
be 
recidivists 
Adolescents 
with less 
initial 
consciousne
ss of guilt 
got better 
results at 
the ART 
institutions 
A more 
individualiz
ed 
approach to 
the use of 
ART for 
those 
adolescents 
who are 
motivated 
for it would 
give better 
results 
Very low‐
powered 
study 
Holmqvis
t, Hill, 
and Lang 
(2009), 
Sweden 
Three potentially relevant studies that failed inclusion criteria related remorse for an index 
offence to a history of recidivism prior to it (Corrado & Peters, 2013; Golu & Gorbănescu, 
2014; Gorbănescu, 2013). Corrado and Peters (2013) evaluated remorse for an index 
offence with 447 incarcerated 12‐ to 19‐year‐olds, using a systematic seven‐point Likert 
scale measure of remorse from Schneider (1990). They related it, however, to lifetime 
frequency of offending before the index incarceration, summarized as ‘chronic offender’ 
(more than four offences) or ‘chronic serious offender’ (more than four serious offences but 
including at least one serious offence). A summary of the results is worth mentioning, 
because they highlighted the importance of allowing for other risk factors for recidivism. 
Once such factors, like history of adverse events, had been taken into account, there was no 
relationship between remorse and chronic offending. There was, however, a tendency for a 
higher remorse score to be associated with a lower likelihood of being in the serous chronic 
offender group. The other two articles, from Romania, similarly measured remorse for an 
index offence, but related it to lifetime offending prior to the offence. They drew out guilt 
and shame distinctions, with their apparent relevance differing between the articles, 
although both studies were on imprisoned women.  
4 DISCUSSION 
It was to my great surprise that such references [to remorse] were scant, almost to the 
point of non‐existence [in the standard forensic psychiatric texts of the time] … all searches 
in specialist libraries, depending on appropriate databases, were only slightly more 
productive…. All the experts, representing the wide variety of disciplines included in this 
book, came up with much the same reply. (Cox, 1999, p. 15). 
Little, it seems, has changed in the 20 years since Murray Cox wrote this. In spite of the 
weight accorded to the concept of remorse in court, and by humanity more generally, we 
found little evidence of empirical study of it. Even then, there were no reports in the 
literature relating directly to people with psychosis. Any reference to them in this context in 
the literature is related almost entirely to symptoms. A person with psychosis may believe, 
for example, that s/he is an evil person or that they committed an unforgivable sin for which 
they must be punished (Kiran & Chaudhury, 2009). Sometimes the guilt felt can be so 
intense that it can be displaced to parts of the body, commonly the face, genitalia and limbs, 
leading to self‐mutilation(Ghaffari‐Nejad, Kerdegari, & Reihani‐Kermani, 2007). 
Furthermore, studies have shown that people with chronic psychotic symptoms have more 
interpersonal guilt feelings as compared with healthy controls and individuals with major 
depression (Britmann, Nasierowski, Murawiec, Pawlus, & Fidler, 2012). Lake (2008) 
constructed an explanatory model of paranoid delusions, particularly but not exclusively in 
affective psychosis, that emerged in a pathway through delusions of guilt. All this amounts 
to a pathological acceptance of guilt or remorse without grounds, and not to feelings in 
relation to a real and terrible act committed, whether as a result of delusions or for more 
ordinary reasons.  
It might be asked why people who kill in the context of not knowing what they were doing, 
or not knowing it was wrong for the believed circumstances, should or could feel any 
remorse while still suffering from the crucial delusion; and perhaps treatment of that 
psychotic symptom or state would be sufficient. Cox (1986), however, also described 
observing a sequencing of realization among people with psychosis who had killed, or come 
close to it, that seemed typical: “I didn't do it”; “I might have done it, but they made me do 
it”; “I did it, but was helpless”. With something approaching illness recovery, this was 
followed by simple acceptance, “I did it”, and finally the appropriate guilt coupled with 
personal responsibility, which is, perhaps, what constitutes remorse: “I did it and I don't 
want to do it again.” Of interest, too, are Gudjonsson's findings that there is a correlation 
between mental attribution scores and acceptance of guilt (Gudjonsson, 1984; Gudjonsson 
& Bownes, 1991; Gudjonsson & Pétursson, 1991; Gudjonsson & Singh, 1988). In other 
words, while blaming external factors for a crime reduces guilt feelings, blaming mental 
illness does not. Gudjonsson suggests that one possible explanation is that attributing an 
offence to the mental disorder is a form of internalising the attribution. Acceptance, for 
example, that had s/he been mentally well at the time of a homicide s/he would not have 
committed the offence may be an indicator of acceptance of the need for treatment, and 
improved safety through treatment.  
Literature on psychopathy might be assumed to be relevant to our review – lack of remorse 
or guilt is one of the items in the ‘selfish, callous and remorseless use of others’ factor of the 
psychopathy checklist (Hare, 1991). This, however, refers to a scale designed to measure an 
enduring trait rather than a response to a specific event. It seems a less helpful concept 
than empathy here because of its circularity, which, put simply, says that people who do not 
experience remorse on numbers of occasions are remorseless. It is surely more useful to try 
to unpick more specific underlying characteristics that could then become a focus for 
treatment.  
A capacity to recognize, feel and understand the state of mind of others by being able to 
imagine what they experience – including what another person is thinking and feeling – and 
to generate an appropriate response to those experiences seems an essential prerequisite 
to remorse. This ability to put oneself in the position of “the other” whilst remaining 
conscious of what belongs to oneself and what belongs to the other is referred to as 
empathy. Empathy might thus be a key capacity or trait as a prerequisite for remorse. There 
has been substantial interest in measuring it in schizophrenia, and studies have been 
consistent in finding generalized impairment in empathy among people with this disorder 
(Achim, Ouellet, Roy, & Jackson, 2011; Bora, Yucel, & Pantelis, 2009; Derntl et al., 2009; 
Haker, Schimansky, Jann, & Rössler, 2012; Lee, Zaki, Harvey, Ochsner, & Green, 2011; 
Montag, Heinz, Kunz, & Gallinat, 2007; Smith, et al., 2015). Although there are no studies 
that relate this directly to homicide, there is evidence that, where empathy is impaired in 
schizophrenia, there is a higher risk of violence than where it is not. There are grounds for 
optimism that interventions may improve capacity, at least for components of empathy, e.g. 
emotion recognition (e.g. Wölwer et al., 2005), or more cognitive aspects of empathy, as in 
theory of mind (Roncone et al., 2004; Shamay‐Tsoory et al., 2007). Furthermore, individuals 
with good recovery from schizophrenia have higher empathy scores than do those in 
remission (Chung et al., 2013).  
4.1 Expression of remorse and violent reoffending 
There is no more than a suggestion from the empirical literature that remorse is associated 
with future good behaviour, or the converse. That said, it is perhaps encouraging that the 
few findings do fit with the increasingly widely accepted model of separating components of 
guilt and shame, with the former having value for resolution and the latter being associated 
with avoidance (Tangney, Stuewig, & Hafez, 2011) and possibly involving pathways through 
capacity for self‐forgiveness associated with sense of guilt but not sense of shame (Griffin et 
al., 2016). Apart from a very few studies, once all other factors that increase risk of 
reoffending have been taken into account, any small relationship seems to be so attenuated 
as to suggest that remorse should not continue to hold its current standing. That said, there 
appears to have been no exploration of the role of remorse specific to homicide or other 
very serious violent offences, which might be different. For homicide, however, it is hard to 
be confident about the truthfulness of expressions of remorse in the course of the criminal 
justice process. On the one hand, in the UK at least, where a charge of murder is more likely 
than not after a homicide, legal advice is generally to plead not guilty, as the lesser offence 
of manslaughter cannot be considered otherwise. Given that acknowledgement of the 
offence is seen as a first step in remorse, the legal process itself may be undermining the 
opportunity to express genuine remorse. In homicide cases, too, there is very little 
opportunity for offender and even secondary victims to communicate with each other 
(Bibas & Bierschbach, 2004), and yet remorse is an interactive process.  
A life in prison does not encourage remorse, perhaps even diminishing it. For life‐sentenced 
prisoners, it can be hard to survive, let alone admit remorse, in a system that is not designed 
to foster empathy (Nussbaum, 2016). We could find nothing specific on interventions with 
respect to remorse, guilt or shame in respect of homicide offenders specifically. There are 
some grounds for optimism that intervention programmes may help if correctly targeted 
(Holmqvist et al., 2009). In particular, an especially pertinent change – in victim empathy – 
may not only occur in itself, but also be associated with lower likelihood of recidivism 
among violent offenders (O'Brien & Daffern, 2017).  
4.2 Limitations 
It is possible that our search terms and choice of literature databases failed to identify 
relevant literature, but they are transparent and presented here. Hand‐searching a list of 
journals that included, at the least, remorse or relevant studies of experience of guilt for an 
act that had harmed others, and soft‐searching through Google failed to add any new 
material. Even the studies we included, while relating to an index episode and subsequent 
offending, did not specify the nature of the offences. 
 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
There is little empirical evidence of any kind to support the weight placed on expression of 
remorse for any index offence in sentencing for that offence or in reviews of consequent 
detention, and none at all relating to a homicide or other serious violent offence by a person 
with schizophrenia. There is a small evidence base to suggest that this would be a fruitful 
area of study, relying on three main lines of research: first, that capacities or traits, 
principally empathy, relevant to being remorseful may be impaired among people with 
schizophrenia; second, that there may be some relationship between what might be 
construed as component parts of remorse – experience of guilt and/or shame for an offence 
or act – and reoffending; and third, that capacities or experience may be changed by 
treatment or other interventions and that relevant changes may, in turn, be associated with 
desistence from further offending. The literature is strong enough to suggest that research 
into valid measurement of remorse for a serious offence, associations of such measures 
with recidivism, and what interventions may work in which subgroups of offenders and in 
which circumstances to promote future safety would be warranted. It is not strong enough 
to support reliance on perceptions of remorse or its absence as a basis for sentencing and 
other judicial decisions. 
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